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THE KYOTO PROTOCOL: WILL IT 
SNEAK UP ON THE U.S.? 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
REENHOUSE GAS (“GHG”) emissions from human activi-
ties have been increasing exponentially since the begin-
ning of the industrial revolution.  Scientists believe that 
human industries like energy production, transport, mining, 
rice cultivation, and other activities that emit GHGs are fun-
damentally changing the way energy from the sun interacts 
with and escapes from our planet's atmosphere.1  The result is 
increasing average temperatures on the earth’s surface and 
shifts in worldwide weather patterns, collectively known as 
global warming.2  How these climatic changes will affect our 
way of life is not entirely clear.3  Some scientists have posited 
that altering wind and rainfall patterns could lead to wide-
spread food shortages, and rising sea levels may threaten is-
lands and low-lying coastal areas.4  Although the impact is not 
entirely understood, it is fairly clear that large volumes of 
GHGs are being poured into the earth’s atmosphere at an 
alarming rate and that there will most certainly be repercus-
sions.5 
  
 1. See Conference of Parties 5 (“COP 5”), Understanding Climate Change:  
A Beginner’s Guide to the U.N. Framework Convention and its Kyoto Protocol 
at http://cop5.unfccc.de/convkp/begconkp.html (last visited Sept. 9, 2001) 
[hereinafter COP5 Website]. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Residents of some areas of Central Europe might take sharp exception 
to this statement.  In the summer of 2002, Central Europe saw torrential 
rains and flooding of a historic scale that caused several deaths and massive 
damage to areas surrounding rivers such as the Danube and the Elbe — all of 
which were arguably the result of global warming.  See Many Germans Believe 
Bush to Blame for European Floods, DEUTSCHE PRESSE-AGENTUR, Aug. 14, 
2002, LEXIS, News & Business, News, By Individual Publication, D, Deutsche 
Presse-Agentur, available at http://www.climateark.org/articles/reader.asp? 
linkid=14352. 
 4. COP5 Website, supra note 1. 
 5. See Miguel Llanos, A Consensus Emerges Around Global Warming, 
MSNBC, at http://www.msnbc.com/news/106332.asp (Jan. 10, 1999). 
G 
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In response to this reality, the United Nations (“U.N.”) cre-
ated the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (“Convention”) in 1992, whose goal is the “stabilization 
of [GHG] concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would 
prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate 
system.”6  In attempting to realize this goal, the Convention 
drafted the Kyoto Protocol (“Protocol”) in 1997, which sets in-
ternational limitations on GHG emissions and establishes a 
global marketplace for the trading of GHGs including carbon 
dioxide (“CO2”), methane (“CH4”), nitrous oxide (“N2O”), hydro-
fluorocarbons (“HFCs”), perfluorocarbons (“PFCs”), and sulphur 
hexafluoride (“SF6”).7  The Protocol limits the amount of GHGs 
that states party to the Protocol (“Contracting Parties”) may 
produce, based on a percentage of their 1990 GHG production 
levels.  The result is that the Contracting Parties, under the 
Protocol, own the rights to produce a certain number of units8 of 
GHGs.9  In turn, each state may allocate or auction its units to 
the GHG producing sectors of its economy according to the goals 
of the Protocol.10  If the Contracting Parties desire to produce 
more pollution than they are allocated, they have several op-
tions such as purchasing additional units from other states11 or 
creating units by funding “sinks,” which are projects, like refor-
estation projects, that remove greenhouse gases from the at-
  
 6. U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, March 21, 1994, art. 
II, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 102–38, 31 I.L.M. 849 [hereinafter UNFCCC]. 
 7. Kyoto Protocol to the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change , 
Dec. 10, 1997, Annex A, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/1997/L.7/Add.1, 37 I.L.M. 22 
[hereinafter Kyoto Protocol]. 
 8. The term “unit” is being used here somewhat carelessly.  Under the 
Marrakesh Accords (explained further below), there are several types of 
“units” whose nomenclature is based on the function the measure is being 
used to quantify.  Specifically, in this context the appropriate term is “as-
signed amount unit” or “AAU,” which is equal to one metric ton of CO2 or CO2 
equivalent.  However, since each type of unit is equal to one metric ton of CO2 
equivalent, the term “unit” is used to refer to one metric ton of CO2 equivalent.  
Report of the Conference of the Parties on Its Seventh Session, Held at Mar-
rakesh, 29 October to 10 November 2001, Seventh Conference of Parties, Part 
Two, Vol. II, Decision 19/CP.7, Draft decision -/CMP.1, Annex I.A., ¶ 3, at 57, 
U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.2 (2002) [hereinafter Marrakesh Accords – 
Vol. II]. 
 9. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 7, at art. 3. 
 10. Id. at art. 2.  
 11. Id. at art. 3 ¶¶ 10–13 (providing for the transferability of GHG units). 
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mosphere.12  In essence, the Protocol turns certain polluting 
gases into commodities, like pork bellies or gold.  In turn this 
allows market forces to operate on GHG emissions and allocate 
its production according to best use, while at the  same time re-
warding those states and entities that employ clean technology 
and best reduce GHG production.13 
Despite its earlier endorsement, the United States (“U.S.”), 
under the Bush Administration, declined to ratify the Proto-
col.14  Although the U.S. has withdrawn its support, large 
American, multinational, GHG-producing corporations may still 
feel the effects of the Protocol.15  This Note will argue that wide-
spread implementation of the Protocol outside the U.S. will 
nonetheless lead to a reduction in domestic U.S. GHG produc-
tion — due to factors such as the forces of globalization, the 
recognition by U.S. lawmakers of their country’s role in combat-
ing GHG production, the increased presence of American affili-
ates abroad, the increasing international pressure on the U.S., 
and the global nature of GHGs.  Part II outlines the structure 
and assumptions behind the Protocol and the accords that will 
be used to implement it.  This Part provides the foundational 
background required to analyze the U.S. refusal to ratify the 
Protocol and demonstrates that the Protocol contains mecha-
nisms that will have the effect of reducing domestic U.S. GHG 
production.  Part III lays out the underlying rationale for and 
against U.S. implementation of the Protocol and demonstrates 
that despite President Bush’s stance on the Protocol, both the 
international community and U.S. lawmakers are dedicated to 
combating global warming.  It then posits that because of this 
  
 12. Id. at art. 3, ¶ 3 (allowing states to use afforestation and reforestation 
projects to meet GHG commitments). 
 13. See Rana Foroohar, The New Green Game: Tradable allowances for 
greenhouse gases may one day become the world’s biggest commodities market, 
NEWSWEEK, Aug. 27, 2001, at 62, available at http://www.climateark.org/ 
articles/2001/3rd/newgrgam.htm. 
 14. See Letter to Members of the Senate on the Kyoto Protocol on Climate 
Change, 37 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 444 (Mar. 19, 2001), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/03/20010314.html (Letter of 
March 13, 2001 detailing President Bush’s reasons for rejecting the Protocol) 
[hereinafter Letter from the President].  
 15. It appears that the Protocol will become effective without U.S. Partici-
pation.  Agreement reached on climate talks, MSNBC, at 
http://www.msnbc.com/news/649465.asp?0cb=21337412 (last visited Nov. 10, 
2001) [hereinafter Climate Talks]. 
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multilateral commitment, the U.S. will not take measures to 
prevent any positive impact international implementation of 
the Protocol may have on the U.S.  Part IV analyzes the phe-
nomenon of globalization and the expansion of U.S. industry 
abroad.  It demonstrates that due to these global forces and the 
nature of GHGs, the Protocol will have a positive effect on do-
mestic production of GHGs despite the refusal of the U.S. to 
ratify.  Part V concludes by noting that although the 
international community may be able to reduce domestic emis-
sions in the U.S. without direct U.S. participation in the Proto-
col, there is still hope to bring the U.S. into international 
schemes to reduce GHGs. 
II. STRUCTURE AND GOALS OF THE PROTOCOL 
The underlying logic of the Protocol is based on two main as-
sumptions.  First, global warming is a global problem that is 
most effectively combated through a solution of equally global 
scale.  Second, market mechanisms are the best and most cost 
effective means of allocating and reducing GHG production.  
These assumptions form the basis of the Protocol and thus per-
meate the mechanisms and structure of the Protocol itself. 
A. Global Warming is a Global Problem 
Global warming is not an issue that can be handled unilater-
ally by any single state, regardless of its size or might.  “The 
undeniable fact is that climate change is a global problem that 
requires a global solution.”16  This truth has been reiterated 
multiple times even by those who oppose implementation of the 
Protocol.  In the U.S. Senate, debate over the Protocol has led 
both to impassioned pleas and a quiet resolve that eventually 
the U.S. must work with the international community to de-
velop solutions to the GHG problem — especially in light of the 
fact that the U.S. produces approximately 25% of the world’s 
GHG emissions.17  There seems to be some general consensus 
  
 16. Frank E. Loy, Under Secretary of State for Global Affairs, Remarks at 
the Earth Technologies Forum for the International Climate Change Partner-
ship (Oct. 30, 2000), at http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/global/climate/ 
00110203.htm, reprinted in Frank E. Loy, The United States Policy on the 
Kyoto Protocol and Climate Change, 15 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV ’T 152 (2001). 
 17. 147 CONG. REC. S8894 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 2001) (statement of Sen. 
McCain).  See infra Part III for further information on the U.S. perspective.  
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among U.S. lawmakers that the largest contributor to global 
warming must take responsibility for its share of the problem.18  
The debate has continued even after U.S. refusal to commit to 
the Protocol.  For example, Senator Lieberman has expressed 
that he is “extremely troubled by the failure of our government 
to engage on this crucial issue [in Kyoto]…I believe this failure 
abdicates the United States’ position as a leader in environ-
mental affairs and places U.S. industry at risk.”19  Ironically, 
despite his public opposition to the Protocol, even President 
Bush has tacitly echoed Senator Lieberman’s sentiments.  
“Even with the best science, even with the best technology, we 
all know the United States cannot solve this global problem 
alone.”20  These recognitions are indicative of the enormity of 
the problem and the global reach required by any solution pro-
posed to solve it. 
Further evidence of the broad support for a global solution is 
presented by the sheer number of states that are signatories to 
the Protocol that was once described as “the most complex, 
broad ranging and ambitious environmental agreement ever 
negotiated by the international community.”21  As of September 
25, 2002, eighty-four states, including the U.S., had signed the 
Protocol, demonstrating a willingness to organize a global re-
  
See also Loy, supra note 16.  The 25% figure used by Senator McCain is 
slightly inflated.  According to the revised estimates in the Marrakesh Ac-
cords, the U.S. produces about 21% of the world’s total GHG emissions.  Re-
port of the Conference of the Parties on Its Seventh Session, Held at Mar-
rakesh, 29 October to 10 November 2001, Seventh Conference of Parties, Part 
Two, Vol. IV, Decision 38/CP.7, Annex, at 33–37, U.N. Doc. 
FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.4 (2002) (Indicative scales of contribution 2002–2003) 
[hereinafter Marrakesh Accords – Vol. IV ]. 
 18. Sen. James Jeffords, Carbon dioxide output rose in 2000, MSNBC, 
available at http://www.msnbc.com/news/655467.asp (last visited Nov. 9, 
2001) [hereinafter CO2 Output Rose]. 
 19. 147 CONG. REC. S8894–95 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 2001) (statement of Sen. 
Lieberman). 
 20.  Remarks on Global Climate Change, 37 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 
876–879 (June 18, 2001), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/ 
releases/2001/06/20010611-2.html (President’s speech in the Rose Garden on 
June 11, 2001) [hereinafter President Bush Discusses Global Climate 
Change]. 
 21. Loy, supra note 16. 
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sponse to GHG emissions.22  In addition, ninety-five states have 
actually ratified or acceded to the Protocol, signifying the inter-
national consensus on the need for a global response.23  
B. Solution: Global Market Mechanisms 
The Protocol is designed to create a global answer to the 
global warming problem, and is endowed with the necessary 
provisions for the establishment of an international GHG trad-
ing system.24  However, before one can analyze the Protocol it-
self, it is important to discuss further the foundational premises 
of the Protocol.  The first premise, as discussed above, is the 
notion that a global problem demands a global solution.25  The 
second premise is that a market system is the most cost effec-
tive means of reducing overall GHG emissions, especially in 
comparison to traditional command-and-control methods.26  It is 
this second premise that this section addresses. 
1. An Argument for Market Mechanisms 
The traditional command-and-control model, in the environ-
mental sense, refers to regulations that require entities to adopt 
certain procedures and technologies in order to meet their re-
duction standards set by the government.27  These regulations 
generally do not distinguish between industry participants.  
These regulations generally dictate both performance and tech-
nology standards, which has the  distinct advantage of facilitat-
ing monitoring and enforcement.28  However, its strength in cre-
ating bright line rules also produces its greatest weakness in 
  
 22. UNFCCC Website, The Convention and Kyoto Protocol, at 
http://unfccc.int/resource/convkp.html (last visited Oct. 5, 2002). Note that the 
U.S. is a signatory to the Protocol but has not ratified it. 
 23. Id. 
 24. See Press Release, United Nations, Governments Adopt Bonn Agree-
ment on Kyoto Protocol Rules, ENV/DEV/594 (July 23, 2001), available at 
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2001/envdev594.doc.htm. 
 25. See supra Part II.A. 
 26. Jennifer Yelin-Kefer, Warming up to an International Greenhouse Gas 
Market:  Lessons from the U.S. Acid Rain Experience, 20 STAN . ENVTL. L.J. 
221, 224 (2001). 
 27. David M. Driesen, Is Emissions Trading an Economic Incentive Pro-
gram?: Replacing the Command and Control/Economic Incentive Dichotomy, 
55 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 289, 296 (1998). 
 28. Yelin-Kefer, supra note 26, at 221, 226. 
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not allowing industry the flexibility required to find more opti-
mal solutions.29   
Command-and-control regulations do not take into account 
the nuances between individual players and industries.30  For 
example, suppose Company A and Company B are subject to 
command-and control regulation that requires both companies 
to reduce their emission levels of pollutant X to 100 units or less 
per year.  This regulation has the obvious advantage of creating 
a bright line rule.31  If A or B’s emissions levels are over 100 
units, then they are in violation of the law.  However, suppose 
that A has the ability to develop new technology that would al-
low it to operate at the same output level while only producing 
90 units of X per year.  Suppose further that if A does not de-
velop the cleaner technology, its X production would remain at 
100 units per year.  B, on the other hand, is not able to develop 
technology or meet its goal, and it produces 110 units.  In order 
to remain within the confines of the regulation, B must cut its 
output levels by a sufficient amount to reduce its X production 
levels to 100 units.  If X production directly correlates with out-
put then B would have to reduce output by 10 units in order to 
comply with the command-and-control regulation.  In this case, 
A had no financial incentive to invest in the development of 
new, cleaner technology as it was already within the limits of 
the regulation and would not have received a return on its 
investment in the development of these technologies, whereas B 
was forced to cut output in order to be within the confines of the 
law.32  Here, the economic costs of the environmental regula-
tions are prohibitive and cause an undue burden on B. 
In comparison, market mechanisms, by merely setting an 
overall limit and creating economic incentives, would alleviate 
the problem described above.33  First, the parties would not be 
  
 29. Id. 
 30. See Driesen, supra note 27, at 289; David M. Driesen, Free Lunch or 
Cheap Fix?: The Emissions Trading Idea and the Climate Change Convention, 
26 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1 (1998). 
 31. Id. 
 32. Yelin-Kefer, supra note 26, at 226.  B does have incentive to develop 
cleaner technologies but may not be in a position to commit to research and 
development because of capital requirements, return on investments, etc. 
 33. Id.  Sale of cleaner technology is an option in the command-and-control 
context, but without incentives for development of these technologies, the 
option has less impact. 
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forced to remain within the individual confines of a command 
regulation.  The companies would be free to trade units, and sell 
and license clean technology in order to both make a profit and 
lower the overall levels of polluting units produced.34  Second, 
market regulation would allow parties to make a more accurate 
cost-benefit analysis of its activities.35  Market mechanisms 
turn the regulated polluting unit into commodities that can be 
priced exactly by the market.36  This has the dual benefit of al-
lowing parties to more accurately assess the importance of its 
polluting activities and in turn leads parties to develop 
technology that is cleaner and cuts costs.37  Moreover, some par-
ties may be able to actually create a source of revenue by selling 
its excess units on the open market.38  Finally, the government 
will also benefit by using market mechanisms to create new 
revenue streams.39  The government could allocate units of pol-
lutants through an auction system, much like the Federal 
Communication Commission (“FCC”) auctions, whereby entities 
would pay to pollute.  In this way, regulators enable the market 
to find the most cost effective means of implementing its law 
without going through the costly and time-consuming process of 
legislative determination.40  In addition, it placates industry, 
especially in the U.S., which has repeatedly said that if Gov-
ernment sets the rules, they will take them from there and 
make a GHG trading system work.41   
Returning to the above example, assume that the regulators 
chose a system that implemented market mechanisms where 
polluting units are transferable and the government has set the 
overall level of X emissions at 200 units, and Companies A and 
B receive 100 units each through public auction.  In this case, A 
has a financial incentive to invest in the development of clean 
technologies because for every unit A is under the 100 unit 
mark, it creates a commodity that can be then sold on the mar-
ket to another producer like B who requires the additional 
  
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Foroohar, supra note 13. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Yelin-Kefer, supra note 26, at 226. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. 147 CONG. REC. S8894 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 2001) (statement of Sen. 
McCain). 
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units.42  Thus, by developing and implementing cleaner tech-
nologies, A has created for itself a surplus of 10 additional 
units, which it can then sell or trade to B.  In this way, overall 
output remains the same and yet production of X has been re-
duced. 
Under a system of regulation using market mechanisms, like 
the system proposed by the Protocol, the parties in this hypo-
thetical would have additional options.  One option is that A 
could sell or license its clean technology to B, which would allow 
A to keep the additional units of X saved as well as generate a 
stream of income from licensing its technology.  Another option 
is that B could try to reduce its X production by reducing units 
of X produced in other areas.  For example, B could fund a pro-
ject that reduces X production in another sector or area of the 
world.  If this project reduces X production by 10 units, then B 
is within its allotment.  This would be an especially attractive 
option for B if the costs of funding the project were significantly 
less than purchasing units from A or licensing A’s technology. 
Regardless of which option A and B ultimately opt for, the 
point is that these entities have not been forced to reduce their 
production of X in any particular way.  They have been given 
the flexibility to analyze for themselves, relative to their own 
individual circumstances, the best and most cost effective 
means for reducing production of X.  Thus, the market mecha-
nism scheme creates a greater equilibrium and allows for the 
best use of the pollutant, while reducing the overall level of pol-
lutant emitted.43  
2. Market Mechanism as a Means of Oppression 
Despite these pro-market mechanisms arguments, they are 
not without their critics, especially as applied to the Protocol.44  
These objections generally come in the form of equity argu-
ments.  One argument begins with the premise that the indus-
trialized world has a long history of economic expansion at the 
expense of underdeveloped nations – exploiting their peoples 
  
 42. In addition, this commodity would be renewable and once established, 
creates a relatively cost-free stream of revenue. 
 43. For a more thorough discussion of the pros and cons of market mecha-
nisms see generally Driesen, supra note 27. 
 44. See, e.g., Yelin-Kefer, supra note 26, at 231–233 (summarizing argu-
ments against the mechanisms used in the Protocol). 
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and natural resources.  Implementing a trading system that 
relies on market mechanisms would simply allow industrialized 
states to continue their disproportionate growth at the expense 
of underdeveloped nations by financially coercing them into for-
going development in exchange  for payments for pollution cred-
its.45  Allowing financial powerhouses to simply purchase cred-
its would, in effect, perpetuate these states’ supremacy and 
permit them to sidestep their responsibility to reduce domestic 
emissions.46   
Similarly, some argue that market mechanism systems that 
allow wealthy nations to gain pollution credits by supporting 
developing countries’ clean air projects and development of car-
bon “sinks” serve as a disincentive to industrialized countries to 
develop new technologies and promote reductions in domestic 
emissions.47  This theory is based on the idea that less deve l-
oped states are “low hanging fruit” or “free lunch” for industrial 
nations since it is easier to fund a reforestation project or power 
plant conversion than make the risky, and possibly “fruitless,” 
investment in technological development.48  In this manner, 
“sinks” become a vessel for technological stagnancy and inhibit 
progress.49 
Although these arguments examine some of the inequities 
that may arise in the relationship between market mechanisms 
and environmental regulation, they do not attack the basic as-
sumption that market mechanisms are a cost effective means of 
reducing overall levels of pollutants.  However, these argu-
ments do present serious questions as to the social responsibil-
ity of implementing such mechanisms.  For this reason, the 
framers of the Protocol had precisely these concerns in mind 
when drafting the document.  The Protocol attempts to limit the 
negative repercussions, as discussed above.50  For example, it 
does not place limits on developing states, only industrialized 
nations, thereby relieving developing states of the burden of 
  
 45. Id. 
 46. Yelin-Kefer, supra note 26, at 232. 
 47. Driesen, supra note 30, at 18–35.  “Sinks” are things that sequester 
carbon from the atmosphere.  See infra Part II.C.1. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id.  
 50. The terms of the Protocol and discussion of particular issues regarding 
the Protocol will be discussed more thoroughly.  See infra Part III.C.  
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deciding whether to forgo long-term growth in exchange for 
temporary gain.51  The Protocol also puts limits on the  number 
of units that may be acquired through the funding and devel-
opment of clean air projects and sinks internationally.52  This 
encourages the initiation of projects within the boarders of for-
eign states, probably undeveloped states not party to the Proto-
col, but yet limits the impact of the “low hanging fruit” problem.  
Suffice it to say, market mechanisms, although not perfect, are 
a desirable means of reaching the ultimate goal of worldwide 
GHG emission reductions. 
C. The Nuts and Bolts of the Kyoto Protocol 
The Protocol of 1997 merely set up a framework within which 
the work of the Convention was to be accomplished in subse-
quent conferences.  As usual, the devil was in the details and it 
took the Contracting Parties several conferences to come to an 
agreement as to the specifics with which this new system is to 
function.  At the sixth meeting of the Convention of Parties 
(“COP 6”),53 held in Bonn, Germany, the 180 states involved 
struck an Eleventh hour political compromise that saved the 
Protocol.54  The next conference, COP 7, held in Marrakesh, Mo-
rocco, was not a negotiating session, but rather a codification of 
the political agreement reached in Bonn.  The accords that re-
sulted from COP 7 in Marrakesh (“Accords”)55 represent the 
labors of the Bonn conference and provide a detailed rulebook 
for the implementation of the Protocol. 
  
 51. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 7, at Annex B (listing the Contracting s-
tates).  This topic was a major point of contention at the Protocol Convention 
and was ultimately one of the issues that led to the U.S. decision not to ratify 
the Protocol.  See infra Part III.B.1. 
 52. See infra Part II.C.2. 
 53. Individual conventions of the Conference of Parties are referred to as 
“COP,” followed by a number designating which convention in the chronology 
is being referred (for example “COP 3” is the third conference).  These confer-
ences are designed for the purpose of creating mechanisms to implement the 
provisions of the Protocol. 
 54. Climate talks resume, CNN, at 
http://www.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/europe/10/28/morocco.climate/index.html 
(Oct. 29, 2001). 
 55. Id. 
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1. Allocation 
Each Contracting Party is allocated a specific number of as-
signed amount units (“AAUs”).56  The number of AAUs allocated 
to a state represents the number of metric tons of CO2 equiva-
lent that the state may produce for a given period.  The final 
tally of AAUs allocated is derived from a reduced percentage57 
of each state’s 1990 aggregate anthropogenic carbon dioxide 
equivalent emissions of GHGs, multiplied by five.58  In addition, 
the Protocol provides that additional units may be earned based 
on land-use change and forestry, which remove GHGs from the 
atmosphere.59 
Each Contracting Party is required to facilitate the calcula-
tion of its assignment amount, by submitting a two-part re-
port.60  The first part requires the Contracting Parties to submit 
a complete inventory of GHG emissions and removals from the 
base year of 1990 to the most current date available, concluding 
with a calculation of its assigned amount on the basis of this 
inventory.61  The second part requires the states to calculate its 
“commitment period reserve,” which includes identification of 
its “election activities,” and their associated land areas, as well 
as a description of the national registry and recording systems – 
aiding in the allocation calculations and verifying national 
monitoring systems.62  In this manner, the Protocol and the Ac-
cords attempt to set up a system of disclosure designed to fairly 
allocate AAUs. 
2. Emission Reduction Unit Mechanisms 
The Protocol and the Accords allow the Contracting Parties to 
reduce GHG emission requirements based on the state’s use of 
  
 56. Each AAU is equal to one metric ton of carbon dioxide or its equivalent.  
Marrakesh Accords – Vol. II, supra note 8, at 57. 
 57. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 7, at Annex B (indicating percentage reduc-
tions for each Contracting Party). 
 58. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 7, art. 3 ¶ 7. 
 59. Id.  This notion will be discussed more thoroughly in the next section.  
See infra Part II.C.2. 
 60. Marrakesh Accords – Vol. II (Decision 19/CP.7, Draft decision -/CMP.1, 
Annex I.B., ¶ 6), supra note 8, at 58. 
 61. Id. ¶ 7, at 58. 
 62. Id. ¶ 8, at 58–59. 
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“sinks,”63 clean development mechanisms (“CDMs”)64, and 
through the trading of emission units.65  These activities66 cre-
ate emission reduction units (“ERUs”), which, once verified by 
supervisory committees,67 may be used toward fulfilling a Con-
tracting Party’s GHG emissions reduction commitments.68  
Thus, if a state funds a reforestation project69 that removes ten 
units of GHG emissions from the atmosphere, then that state 
would receive an additional ten ERUs, giving the state the right 
to produce ten units of GHGs.  All CDM project activity occur-
ring as of the year 2000 is eligible for validation so long as it is 
submitted to the commission for registration before December 
31, 2005.70  A state’s eligibility to participate in these mecha-
nisms is contingent on its compliance with methodological and 
reporting requirements,71 providing an incentive for the Con-
tracting Parties to comply with the Protocol’s compliance proce-
dures.   
  
 63. Sinks are defined as removals of GHGs resulting from “direct human-
induced land-use change and forestry activities.”  Kyoto Protocol, supra note 
7, at art. 3, ¶ 3.  
 64. CDMs are projects conducted by Annex I, participating, industrialized 
states, occurring in states that are not included under Annex I.  Kyoto Proto-
col, supra note 7, at art. 12.  The theory is that global warming is an interna-
tional problem, and it makes no difference where the emissions occur.  Under 
this line of reasoning, a reduction in emissions in another state is equally as 
beneficial as a reduction within the boarders of the Contracting Party, and 
should count toward the Contracting Party’s overall reduction requirement. 
 65. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 7, at art. 17; Marrakesh Accords – Vol. II 
(Decision 18/CP.7), supra note 8, at 50–54. 
 66. This is excluding the trading of units, which does not create new units 
but rather transfers ownership of previously existing units. 
 67. Supervisory committees are set up under the Accords to verify ERUs 
that come from each of the mechanisms allowed for under Articles 6, 12, and 
17 of the Protocol.  See e.g., Marrakesh Accords – Vol. II (Decision 16/CP.7, 
Draft decision -/CMP.1, ¶ 3), supra note 8, at 6 (Article 6 committee). 
 68. Marrakesh Accords – Vol. II (Decision 15/CP.7, Draft decision -/CMP.1, 
¶ 6), supra note 8, at 4. 
 69. This could mean that these projects are funded by either state govern-
ments or through private entities. 
 70. Marrakesh Accords – Vol. II (Decision 17/CP.7, ¶ 13), supra note 8, at 
23. 
 71. Marrakesh Accords – Vol. II (Decision 15/CP.7, Draft decision -/CMP.1, 
¶ 5), supra note 8, at 4; see Kyoto Protocol, supra note 7, arts. 5, 7 (detailing 
requirements for measurement methodologies, and information communica-
tion). 
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The enforcement branch of the Compliance Committee is re-
sponsible for oversight of ERU/CDM mechanisms,72 which are 
scheduled to be reviewed no later than one year after the end of 
the first commitment period.73  The review will be based on the 
recommendations of the Articles 6, 12, and 17 supervisory 
committees and by the Subsidiary Body for Implementation, 
drawing on technical advice from the Subsidiary Body for Scien-
tific and Technological Advice.74  These supervisory bodies en-
sure that both the reporting and scientific underpinnings of 
unit allocation and ERU credits are and continue to be consis-
tent with reality.  These bodies will act not only as auditors but 
also as policy makers and review the impact of policy choices 
made in the framing of the Protocol and subsequent accords.  
For example, under the Accords, the Conference made the pol-
icy decision that Article 12 afforestation and reforestation pro-
ject activities (“sinks”) may only account for a maximum of 1% 
of base year emissions times five that a Party may use towards 
its first commitment period goals.75  The supervisory bodies will 
analyze whether provisions like this are serving their intended 
functions.  In this manner the Protocol and its accords provide 
for a continuing review of the effectiveness of both its scientific 
and political assumptions.  
3. Monitoring 
Monitoring will be conducted through both national and in-
ternational monitoring groups, which will not only monitor 
emissions but also monitor the impact of GHGs on the climate.  
These groups will accomplish their goals by collecting data such 
as climate and hydroclimate studies, geographical information 
  
 72. Marrakesh Accords – Vol. II (Decision 15/CP.7, Draft decision -/CMP.1, 
¶ 5), supra note 8, at 4. 
 73. The first commitment period lasts from 2008–2012.  Kyoto Protocol, 
supra note 7, at art. 3 ¶ 1. 
 74. Marrakesh Accords – Vol. II (Decision 16/CP.7, Draft decision -/CMP.1, 
¶ 8), supra note 8, at 6–7 (Article 6); Marrakesh Accords – Vol. II (Decision 
17/CP.7, Draft decision -/CMP.1, ¶ 4), supra note 8, at 24 (Article 12); Mar-
rakesh Accords – Vol. II (Decision 18/CP.7, ¶ 2), supra note 8, at 50 (Article 
17).  
 75. Marrakesh Accords – Vol. II (Decision 17/CP.7, ¶ 7(b)), supra note 8, at 
22.  This provision addresses the concern that states will be able to shirk their 
responsibility to reduce domestic emissions by simply going after the “low 
hanging fruit.”  See infra Part II.B. 
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systems, sea-level rise, fire hazards, and land degradation sta-
tistics.76  The Protocol requires that each state have in place, no 
later than one year prior to the start of the first commitment 
period a national system for the estimation of anthropogenic 
emissions by sources and removals by sinks of all GHGs.77  The 
national monitoring systems are required to send information 
regarding their GHG registries to the secretariat in “a standard 
electronic format,” that will account for the total numbers of 
ERUs, CERs, AAUs, and RMUs.78  “Expert review teams” will 
then sort through the information and ascertain whether the 
state’s national system has complied with the reporting guide-
lines and cross-check the information on transfers and acquisi-
tions of units.79  The committee will also conduct “in-country 
review” of national registries to ensure compliance with the 
provisions of the Accords.80 
4. Enforcement 
The Compliance Committee will function as a plenary of two 
branches – the facilitative branch and the enforcement 
branch.81  The enforcement branch, as the name would indicate, 
determines whether a Contracting Party included in Annex I is 
not in compliance with any of the requirements of the Protocol 
or the Accords, and determines the consequences for non-
  
 76. Report of the Conference of the Parties on Its Seventh Session, Held at 
Marrakesh, 29 October to 10 November 2001, Seventh Conference of Parties, 
Part Two, Vol. I, Decision 5/CP.7, ¶ 7, at 34, U.N. Doc. 
FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.1 (2002). 
 77. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 7, at art. 5 ¶ 1. 
 78. Emission Reduction Unit (“ERU”), Certified Emission Reduction 
(“CER”), Assigned Amount Unit (“AAU”), Removal Unit (“RMU”).  Marrakesh 
Accords – Vol. II (Decision 19/CP.7, Draft decision -/CMP.1, Annex III.A., ¶ 
49), supra note 8, at 68. 
 79.  Report of the Conference of the Parties on Its Seventh Session, Held at 
Marrakesh, 29 October to 10 November 2001, Seventh Conference of Parties, 
Part Two, Vol. III, Decision 23/CP.7, Appendix 1, ¶ 5, at 32–33, U.N. Doc. 
FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.3 (2002) [hereinafter Marrakesh Accords – Vol. III]. 
 80. Marrakesh Accords – Vol. III (Decision 23/CP.7 , Appendix 1, ¶ 10), 
supra note 79, at 34. 
 81. Marrakesh Accords – Vol. III (Decision 24/CP.7 , Annex II., ¶ 2), supra  
note 79, at 65.  The “plenary” aspect of the Compliance Committee is a bureau 
made up of members of the two branches, which, among other things, reports 
the activities of the Compliance Committee at COPs.  See, Marrakesh Accords 
– Vol. III (Decision 24/CP.7, Annex III.), supra note 79, at 66–67. 
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compliance.82  The consequences are either to adjust the non-
complying Party’s inventories under Article 5 of the Protocol, or 
make a correction to the compilation and accounting database 
for the accounting of AAVs under Article 7.83  In either event, 
the rebuke of a non-complying Party is based on punitively al-
tering their target goals.  In addition, the provisions of the Pro-
tocol will also be enforced through controlling access to GHG 
trading.  An Annex I Party84 is eligible to transfer and/or ac-
quire (trade) ERUs, CERs, AAUs, or RMUs85 if it is a Party to 
the Protocol, has followed the prescribed monitoring procedures, 
has a national system for the estimation of anthropogenic emis-
sions, and has made the prescribed transfer of information ac-
cording to the Protocol and the Accords.86  Thus, if a Contract-
ing Party is not in compliance with the Protocol, then the 
enforcement and/or facilitative branch may prevent the state 
from participating in the trading scheme under the Protocol.   
D. The Protocol — Ready for Action 
The Protocol will not take affect until at least fifty-five Con-
tracting Parties, representing at least 55% of the world’s GHG 
emissions, have ratified the Protocol.87  Since the U.S. has al-
ready made clear that it will not support the Protocol and see-
ing that the U.S. produces 21% of the world’s GHGs, for the 
Protocol to take affect, there must be virtual unanimity among 
all remaining industrialized nations.88  However, it appears that 
  
 82. Marrakesh Accords – Vol. III (Decision 24/CP.7, Annex V.), supra note 
79, at 68–69. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Annex I refers to industrialized states that have signed the Protocol 
and have been allocated a commitment level under Annex B of the Protocol.  
Kyoto Protocol, supra note 7, Annex B. 
 85. Marrakesh Accords – Vol. II (Decision 19/CP.7, Draft decision -/CMP.1, 
Annex I.A.), supra note 8, at 57. 
 86. Marrakesh Accords – Vol. II (Decision 18/CP.7, Draft decision -/CMP.1, 
Annex, ¶ 2), supra note 8, at 52–53.  Lists of eligible trading parties are to be 
publicly accessible and maintained by the secretariat.  Marrakesh Accords – 
Vol. II (Decision 18/CP.7, Draft decision -/CMP.1, Annex, ¶ 4), supra note 8, at 
53. 
 87. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 7, at art. 25 ¶ 1. 
 88. The Marrakesh Accords list 187 states and their estimated respective 
contributions to the world’s production of GHGs — totaling 100%.  Of the 187 
states listed, the top 30 producing states produce approximately 90% of the 
world’s GHG emissions with the top 4 producers emitting about 55%.  This 
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the requisite consensus has formed around the Protocol.  As of 
October 16, 2002, ninety-six Contracting Parties have ratified 
the Protocol, representing 37.4% of the world’s GHG emis-
sions.89  With the numerical requirement for effectiveness al-
ready fulfilled, the Protocol will become effective if states repre-
senting an additional 17.6% of the world’s GHG emissions 
commit to ratification.  Many commentators believe this will in 
fact occur within the next year .90  In any event, it is clear that 
the Protocol will most likely come into effect, and that this sur-
prising unanimity of purpose is the result of dedicated negotia-
tion and compromise.    
Umbrella states91 like Russia, Japan, and Canada were at 
first reluctant to ratify the Protocol without U.S. involvement.  
However, last minute concessions by the states in the European 
Union (“EU”) have opened the way to widespread ratification by 
governments.92  The Japanese government has recently ratified 
the Protocol, which at the time brought the total number of rati-
fying nations to seventy-three, representing 36% of the world’s 
total GHGs emissions.93  Although Japan had previously stated 
  
means that if the top 4 producers — U.S., Japan, Germany, and France — 
were to ratify the Protocol, the percentage requirement for effectiveness would 
be met.  However, without U.S. support, the Protocol would require ratifica-
tion from the top 11 producers of GHGs.  If Japan, which produces 19% of the 
world’s GHG emissions, were to take back its ratification, the Protocol would 
require ratification from more than 40 of the next top producers.  Marrakesh 
Accords – Vol. IV , supra note 17. 
 89. COP 8 Website, Kyoto Protocol Thermometer at http://unfccc.int/ 
resource/kpthermo_if.html (last visited Oct. 28, 2002) (providing chart show-
ing ratification progress). 
 90. See Russia close to Kyoto signing, CNN, at http://www.cnn.com/2002/ 
WORLD/africa/09/03/kyoto.russia.glb/index.html (Sept. 3, 2002). 
 91. At the COP meetings, a partnership of states called the “Umbrella 
Group,” including Australia, Canada, Japan, Norway, Russia, and the United 
States, had a foundation of similar views relating to the Protocol.  Press Re-
lease, Union of Concerned Scientists, Flexibility and Credibility: The Keys to 
the Kyoto Protocol, at http://www.ucsusa.org/releases/flex.html (last visited 
Oct. 5, 2002). 
 92. Press Release, U.N. FCCC, Governments ready to ratify Kyoto Protocol 
(Nov. 10, 2001), available at http://unfccc.int/press/prel2001/pressrel101101. 
pdf. 
 93. Section 1.01 Department for Environment Food and Rural Affairs 
(DEFRA), United Kingdom, Kyoto Protocol: Japan ratifies, Australia 
rejects, at http://www.defra.gov.uk/news/latest/2002/japanoz.htm (last 
visited Oct. 5, 2002) (Japan ratified the Protocol on June 5, 2002). 
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that the main hurdle to ratification was participation by the 
U.S., as a result of intense lobbying and compromise by the EU, 
Japan has agreed to the terms of the Protocol.94  In addition, the 
Russian delegation has made explicit overtures that the Proto-
col will be ratified by the Russian Federation.95   Even though 
the Accords did not resolve every issue, in the words of one 
commentator, “I prefer an imperfect agreement that is living to 
a perfect agreement that doesn’t exist.”96      
III. THE PROTOCOL: THE U.S. PERSPECTIVE 
The U.S. and supporters of the Protocol are in agreement as 
to the best means of combating global warming — in principle.  
Both recognize the urgency of the problem, the need to take ac-
tion on a global scale, and the  benefits of using market mecha-
nisms to accomplish real GHG reductions.  Despite this seeming 
harmony of opinion, U.S. concerns over issues like the exclusion 
of developing countries and the economic impact of drastic GHG 
reductions have guided U.S. policy and led to President Bush’s 
declaration that the U.S. would not ratify the Protocol.  For its 
part, the Bush administration has countered with its own vol-
untary GHG emissions reduction program.  Although this pro-
gram falls far short of the Protocol’s guidelines, it demonstrates 
that the U.S. has not completely turned a blind eye to the need 
to reduce GHG emissions, and provides support for the belief 
that the U.S. still has an important role to play in reducing 
GHGs. 
  
 94. Japan may act on Pact without U.S., CNN, at 
http://www.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/asiapcf/east/08/09/japan.environment/index
.htm (Aug. 9, 2001). 
 95. Climate treaty set to be ratified, CNN, at http://www.cnn.com/2001/ 
TECH/science/11/10/climate.talks/index.html (Nov. 10, 2001) (quoting Alex-
ander Bedritsky, head of the Russian delegation at COP 7); Alastair Mac-
donald and Ed Stoddard, Russia, China say back Kyoto global warming pact, 
REUTERS, available at http://www.enn.com/news/wire-stories/2002/ 
09/09042002/reu_48333.asp (Sept. 4, 2002). 
 96. Work starts on Kyoto Deal details, CNN, at 
http://www.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/europe/ 07/23/kyoto.talks/index.html (July 
23, 2001) (quoting Oliver Deleuze, chief European Union negotiator at COP 7). 
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A. U.S. Commitment to Reducing GHGs 
Despite its refusal to participate in the Protocol, the U.S. has 
repeatedly attempted to reduce the impact of global warming.  
During the 1990s, the Clinton Administration made strong 
commitments toward both international and unilateral solu-
tions to solving the global warming problem.  Under Clinton’s 
leadership, the U.S. signed the Protocol,97 secured more than $1 
billion in funding for domestic renewable energy and programs 
to reduce emissions, and campaigned for further funding of 
clean energy research and development.98  In addition, then 
President William J. Clinton issued an Executive Order direct-
ing the federal government — the world’s largest energy con-
sumer — to reduce gasoline use by 20% by 2005, and reduce 
GHG emissions from federal buildings by 30% by 2010.99  These 
efforts appear to have at least retarded the growth of U.S. emis-
sions, as evidenced by a decoupling of emissions growth from 
economic growth.100  In the 1990s, CO2 emissions grew by 12% 
while the U.S. economy as a whole grew by 33%.101  This retar-
dation and concerted government effort demonstrates the U.S. 
recognition of the GHG problem and its willingness to exert its 
power to be proactive in facilitating emission reductions.   
President George W. Bush has also taken some strides, be 
they small, toward curbing GHG emissions in the U.S.  On Feb-
ruary 14, 2002, the White House announced its “Clear Skies & 
Global Climate Change Initiatives.”102  The President’s plan 
calls for reduction in GHG “intensity”103 by 18% over the next 
  
 97. President Clinton signed the Protocol but it was never ratified by the 
Senate.  See S. Res. 98, 105th Cong. (1997). 
 98. Loy, supra note 16. 
 99. Exec. Order No. 13,123, 64 Fed. Reg. 30,851 (June 3, 1999).  These 
reduction figures represent percentages of 1990 levels of GHG emissions — 
the exact same year the Protocol uses as its basis.  
 100. Loy, supra note 16.  Meaning that growth in the economy does not en-
tail a corollary growth in GHG emissions.  
 101. Id. 
 102. See Remarks Announcing the Clear Skies and Global Climate Change 
Initiatives in Silver Spring, Maryland, 36 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 232–236 
(Feb. 18, 2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/ 
2002/02/20020214–5.html  (President Bush’s speech to National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) on February 14, 2002) [hereinafter Clear 
Skies Initiative]. 
 103. The plan defines “intensity” as the ratio of GHG emissions to economic 
output or, more specifically, number of metric tons of GHG emissions per mil-
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ten years, which Bush declares is “comparable to the average 
progress that nations participating in the Kyoto Protocol are 
required to achieve.”104  Despite any challenges to the validity of 
this claim, it is important to note that the President is using the 
Protocol as the benchmark with which he is comparing his do-
mestic GHG reduction plan.  In other words, President Bush is 
aspiring to meet the goals of the Protocol, even though he re-
fuses to use its mechanisms. 
In addition to his own affirmative actions to curb GHG pro-
duction in the U.S., President Bush has also publicly declared 
that “[t]he United States will not interfere with the plans of any 
nation that chooses to ratify the Kyoto protocol.”105  The Presi-
dent’s statement underscores the fact that he is not adverse to 
the goals of the Protocol, and by implication would probably not 
attempt to thwart any positive impact the Protocol might have 
on domestic U.S. GHG emissions.  
Other American lawmakers have also demonstrated that they 
are not adverse to GHG regulation, even regulation on an in-
ternational scale.106  On the contrary, despite having opted out 
of the Protocol, the U.S. government on the whole appears to be 
amenable and arguably proactive in reducing the emission of 
climate warming gases.  Several bills have been circulating in 
  
lion dollars of gross domestic product (“GDP”).  Press Release, Office of the 
Press Secretary, The White House, Fact Sheet:  President Announces Clear 
Skies & Global Climate Change Initiatives (Feb. 14, 2002), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/02/20020214.html [hereinafter 
Clear Skies Fact Sheet]. 
 104. Id.  This claim is very misleading.  By defining GHG emissions reduc-
tions in terms of “intensity,” the U.S. is only reducing its growth in emissions 
by 18% as opposed to the Protocol’s scheme, which requires a percentage re-
duction from 1990 levels.  Thus, if the U.S. GDP grows by 30% over the next 
10 years, the President’s 18% reduction will only be a reduction on that in-
crease.  This may slow the worsening of global warming, but will certainly 
allow the overall number of metric tons of GHGs emitted in the U.S. to in-
crease as fast as the economy can grow.  Obviously, this is far less reaching 
than the Protocol envisions. 
 105. Clear Skies Initiative, supra note 102. 
 106. A recent bill proposed in the Senate recognizes this proposition stating, 
“a new long-term, technology-based, cost-effective, flexible, and global strategy 
to ensure long-term energy security and manage the risk of climate change is 
needed, and should be promoted by the United States in its domestic and in-
ternational activities in this regard.”  Climate Change Risk Management Act 
of 2001, S. 1294, 107th Cong. § 2 (11) (2001) (bill was referred to the Senate 
Committee on Energy and Natural Resources). 
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both houses of the U.S. Congress, accompanied by much debate, 
proposing various systems to reduce GHG emissions.107  Such 
bills have entailed the establishment of a mandatory GHG re-
porting system,108 and voluntary GHG trading system.109  Sena-
tors Chuck Hagel, Frank Murkowski, and Larry Craig have 
proposed to spend $2 billion over ten years on new technology to 
reduce GHG emissions, and other incentives to sell the technol-
ogy to developing nations like China and India.110  In addition to 
the proposed alternatives to the Protocol, many politicians, both 
Democrats and Republicans, have rebuked President Bush from 
withdrawing from the Protocol.  For example, the Senate For-
eign Relations Committee called on the White House to partici-
pate in international global warming negotiations and to bring 
an alternative proposal to future COP meetings.111 
In addition to national efforts to curb GHG emissions, state 
and regional cooperation in the U.S. has led to valuable strides 
toward domestic reductions.  For example, the New England 
Governors and Eastern Canadian Premiers have adopted reso-
lutions to help reduce GHG emissions within their own spheres 
of influence.112  The non-binding agreements, which are strik-
ingly similar to the terms of the Protocol, sends a “strong mes-
  
 107. See Chris Baltimore, Republican Senators offer Kyoto treaty alternative , 
REUTERS, at http://www.greenhousenet.org/news/august-2001/senatorsoffer 
.html (Aug. 2, 2001).  At minimum, these bipartisan proposals are a strong 
acknowledgment from both American parties that global warming is a prob-
lem that must be addressed. 
 108. National Greenhouse Gas Emissions Inventory Act of 2002, H.R. 4611, 
107th Cong. (2002). 
 109. Fuel Economy and Security Act of 2002, S. 1923, 107th Cong. (2002).  
See Loy, supra note 16.  Many of these recommendations found their way into 
President Bush’s Clear Sky Initiatives.  See e.g., Clear Skies Fact Sheet, supra 
note 103 (noting the President’s commitment to improve the U.S. GHG regis-
try “taking into account emerging domestic and international approaches”). 
 110. See International Energy Technology Deployment Program, S. 1294, 
107th Cong., § 6 (2001); see also Baltimore, supra note 107. 
 111. S. 1401, 107th Cong. § 778(b)(3) (2001). 
 112. See, e.g., New England Governors and Eastern Canadian Premiers, 
Res. 25-9 (July 18, 2000) (resolution concerning global warming and its im-
pacts on the environment).  This conference represents a bipartisan group 
that involves both American and Canadian officials, who discuss regional 
issues.  Michael Schaeffer, N.E. governors to turn up heat in fight against 
global warming, MSNBC, available at http://www.msnbc.com/local/fddber 
/m84359.asp (Aug. 26, 2001). 
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sage about the importance of reducing emissions and using en-
ergy more efficiently.”113   
Individual U.S. states are also providing a means to combat 
GHG emissions.  California, for example, recently passed com-
prehensive legislation providing a mandate for the reduction of 
GHGs by empowering state administrative agencies to pass 
rules and regulations governing GHG production.114  The legis-
lation, among other things, continues a state GHG registry for 
monitoring of emissions, which coincidentally is required under 
the Protocol.115  In addition, it increases the number of miles per 
gallon required of vehicles sold in California.116  These types of 
measures demonstrate that despite President Bush’s refusal to 
officially support the Protocol, there is a willingness to act on 
the issue of global warming and accomplish the goals of the Pro-
tocol through means other than dejure federal compliance. 
The U.S. has also signaled its willingness to reduce GHG 
emissions and participate in a global solution through its mem-
bership in certain international organizations.  For example, 
the G8117 countries have made clear their intention to work both 
domestically and internationally in order to combat GHG emis-
sions.118  The G8 have formally recognized that GHG emissions 
  
 113. Schaeffer, supra note 112 (quoting Pamela Walsh, spokeswoman for 
New Hamshire Governor Jeanne Shaheen). 
 114. 2002 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 200 (A.B. 1493) (West), Vehicular emissions; 
Greenhouse gases.  California is a particularly important state to be leading 
this charge given its importance as a legislative forerunner and considering it 
is the 5th largest economy in the world.  See id . § 1(b). 
 115. Id. § 2.  Note the text of this legislation is an amendment to the Cali-
fornia Health and Safety Code, relating to air quality. 
 116. See Press Release, Union of Concerned Scientists, California Sets New 
Standard in Drive to Curb Global Warming (July 2, 2002), at 
http://www.ucsusa.org/releases/07-02-02.html. 
 117. The G8 consists of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the 
U.K. and the U.S., with the European Union participating with “observed 
status.”  The G8 was originally formed to deal with essentially macroeconomic 
issues but has since expanded its scope to include issues such as terrorism, 
drugs, and the environment.  See G8 Summit Website, G8 Background, at 
http://www.g8.gc.ca/aboutbackgrnd-e.asp (last visited Oct. 28, 2002); G8 
Summit Website, How the G8 Works, at http://www.g8.gc.ca/abouthow-e.asp 
(last visited Oct. 28, 2002).  
 118. Although the G8 has made such declarations, they were unable to 
reach any specific agreement on the Protocol.  See G8 Environment Ministers 
Communiqué, Trieste, Italy, March 2–4, 2001, available at 
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are altering the atmosphere in ways that are expected to affect 
the climate.119  In addition, the G8 have recommitted them-
selves to take the lead in combating climate change and recog-
nize that “a firm consensus for action on climate change is 
needed.”120  Although the G8, and the U.S. by implication, have 
fallen short of recommending the Protocol for ratification, the 
tenor of the organization’s statements demonstrates a willing-
ness to support the goals of the Protocol and act in a global 
manner to bring about such change. 
Judging from the myriad of proposals and overall interest in 
the subject of global warming, it is apparent that although the 
U.S. will not ratify the Protocol in its current form, the U.S. has 
recognized its international obligation to curb its GHG emis-
sions and its responsibility to work toward an international so-
lution.  The import of this finding is that it signifies that the 
U.S. is not opposed to the goals of the Protocol, and arguably 
will not attempt to inhibit any positive impact the Protocol may 
have on the U.S. 
B. No to Kyoto 
Two camps emerged at the COP meetings: the EU, and a 
partnership of states called the “Umbrella Group.”121  Although 
these two groups had the same primary objective — to create a 
climate protection regime — they came to a crossroads over the 
issue of implementation.  Their differences included squabbles 
over allocation levels for certain states, enforcement procedures, 
and level playing field arguments on the effects of the Protocol 
on trade.122  While all of these issues were sticking points in the 
negotiations, the most important, and ultimately decisive fac-
tors were their positions on whether developing countries 
should be included in the Protocol and its impact on the econ-
omy. 
  
http://www.esteri.it/g8/documentazione/docum02e.htm (last visited Oct. 28, 
2002). 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. See supra note 91. 
 122. Id. 
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1. The Developing Country Exception 
As currently drafted, the Protocol does not include emissions 
standards for developing countries.  The U.S., together with 
other members of the Umbrella Group, came to a loggerhead 
with the EU over this issue.  The EU, keeping to one of the ten-
ants of the Protocol, argued that the largest share of historical 
and current emissions originate in developed (industrialized) 
countries, and therefore these countries should take the lead in 
combating climate change and its adverse effects.123  It would be 
fundamentally unfair to stunt the economic progress of indus-
trializing nations by enforcing GHG emission requirements, 
simply because those states where unable to industrialize be-
fore the Protocol.  
The Umbrella Group, with the U.S. taking the lead, had a 
much different perspective with respect to the inclusion of de-
veloping countries in the Protocol.  They argued that emerging 
markets like China, India, Mexico, South Korea, as well as an-
other 130 nations not bound by the Protocol, are growing at an 
explosive rate, such that the increase in emissions from these 
states would quickly overshadow any reductions made by the 
participating parties.124  For example, developing countries al-
ready produce 44% of global fossil fuel emissions and, owing 
largely to geographic and economic conditions, are responsible 
for a disproportionate share of deforestation and other land use 
practices that have raised carbon concentrations.125  In addition, 
it is estimated that 80% of new electric power generation pro-
jects will occur in these non-participating countries, creating 
new sources of GHG that will not be subject to the restrictions 
of the Protocol.126  As such, the Umbrella Group argued that 
providing this large exception swallows the rule and severely 
  
 123. See Wolfgang Steinborn, Global Climate Change and GIS, at 
http://www.geoplace.com/ge/2001/0111/0111ltr.asp (last visited Oct. 28, 2002); 
COP 5 Website, Kyoto Protocol History, at 
http://cop5.unfccc.de/convkp/begconkp.html (last visited Aug 4, 2001). 
 124. Sen. Frank H. Murkowski (R-Alaska), The Kyoto Protocol is not the 
Answer to Climate Change, 37 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 345 (2000). 
 125. See Loy, supra note 16. 
 126. See id.  Although such projects would not be directly subject to the 
Protocol, they represent opportunities for the Contracting Parties to earn 
additional units by financing the use of cleaner technology. 
File: Temple Base  Macro final2.doc Created on: 11/13/2002 2:10 PM Last Printed: 4/28/2003 3:26 PM 
2002] KYOTO PROTOCOL 237 
limits the effectiveness of the Protocol so as to render it ineffec-
tive.127 
The U.S. Senate has hammered this point home with the pas-
sage of the Byrd-Hagel Resolution (“Byrd-Hagel”), laying out its 
position with regard to the developing country exception — 
Whereas the exemption for Developing Country Parties is in-
consistent with the need for global action on climate change 
and is environmentally flawed; Whereas the Senate strongly 
believes that the proposals under negotiation, because of the 
disparity of treatment between Annex I Parties [Industrialized 
Countries] and Developing Countries and the level of required 
emission reductions, could result in serious harm to the 
United States economy, including significant job loss, trade 
disadvantages, increased energy and consumer costs, or any 
combination thereof . . . .128 
Byrd-Hagel made it explicit that the U.S. would not become a 
party to any treaty that did not apply to developing countries.  
This sentiment was given a resounding exclamation point with 
the Senate passage of the resolution 95–0.129  President Bush 
has reiterated the sentiments of the Senate but has been care-
ful not to completely alienate the U.S. from the international 
community. “America’s unwillingness to embrace a flawed 
treaty should not be read by our friends and allies as any 
abdication of responsibility.  To the contrary, [the] 
administration is committed to a leadership role on the issue of 
climate change.”130  Despite President Bush’s desire to play a 
“leadership role,” it is clear that the U.S. government will not 
ratify the Protocol in its existing form with the inclusion of the 
developing country exception. 
2. Economic Impact and the Effect of the California Power 
Crisis 
U.S. opposition to the Protocol, based largely on the develop-
ing country exception, has been further solidified by domestic 
power shortages and increases in the cost of power.  The power 
crisis that gripped California in 2001 again put energy on the 
  
 127. Id. 
 128. S. Res. 98, 105th Cong. (1997). 
 129. See 144 CONG. REC. S3240 (1998) (debate in the U.S. Senate one year 
after the Bryd-Hagel Resolution). 
 130. President Bush Discusses Global Climate Change, supra note 20. 
File: Temple  Base  Macro final2.doc Created on:  11/13/2002 2:10 PM Last Printed: 4/28/2003 3:26 PM 
238 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 28:1 
national agenda.131  The rolling brown-outs and rapidly increas-
ing energy prices created a sense of urgency in the energy sector 
and led to the release of oil from the national reserves and de-
bate over opening up the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge in 
Alaska for oil exploration.132  It is against this backdrop that the 
narrowly elected Bush Administration rejected the Protocol.133  
The crisis had politicized power prices, which made the Proto-
col, and its possibly significant impact on energy prices, a politi-
cally dangerous subject.  
Opponents of the Protocol argued that in light of the power 
crisis, the considerable costs of implementing the Protocol sim-
ply could not be justified.134  As with any major piece of compre-
hensive regulation, quantifying the implementation costs has 
been varied and difficult to assess.  Some claim that the Proto-
col would require the U.S. to reduce its energy use to 40% below 
the levels expected in 2010, the mid-range year of the first com-
pliance period under the Protocol.135  In addition to reduced en-
ergy use, implementation of the Protocol could cause gasoline 
prices to rise by 53% and electricity prices by 86% over the next 
decade.136  The thought of such dizzying increases in the cost of 
energy provides strong rhetoric against the Protocol when cou-
pled with the political realities and repercussions of the 2001 
California energy crisis. 
3. Other Points of Contention 
Besides the two main U.S. issues, there were several other 
points of contention between the EU and the other Umbrella 
  
 131. Yahoo! provides an excellent compilation of articles and websites re-
garding the California energy crisis and energy deregulation.  See Yahoo! New 
Coverage, Utility Industry, Deregulation at 
http://story.news.yahoo.com/fc?cid34&tmpl=fc&in=Business&cat=Utility_Indu
stry_Deregulation (last visited Oct. 4, 2002). 
 132. See Sierra Club Website, Artic National Wildlife Refuge at 
http://www.sierraclub.org/wildlands/arctic/ (last visited Sept. 30, 2002). 
 133. See Tony Eufinger, Hostile Environment: Europe Turns Up Heat on 
Bush Over Global Warming, ABCNEWS.COM, at 
http://abcnews.go.com/sections/politics/DailyNews/Kyoto010612.html (last 
visited Oct. 3, 2002) 
 134. See generally Murkowski, supra note 124. 
 135. Id. at 346. 
 136. Id. (citing Energy Information Admin., U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Impacts of 
the Kyoto Protocol on U.S. Energy Markets and Economic Activity  (1998)). 
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countries.137  Japan, for example, was against making penalties 
for countries that fail to meet their Protocol targets legally 
binding.138  The EU, in a move that clearly demonstrates the 
importance of Japan’s participation in the Protocol,139 gave 
ground by dropping the word “legally” from descriptions of the 
binding force on countries that did not meet their Protocol tar-
gets.140  However, EU officials insisted that the targets would 
still be “binding” on non-complying states.141 
Another point of contention arose between the EU and na-
tions with great areas of national forests like Canada and Rus-
sia.  The Protocol provides that a state may obtain credits to-
wards its GHG targets through the development and preserva-
tion of sinks that naturally take GHGs out of the atmosphere.142  
There was much debate as to how these sinks should be quanti-
fied and the upper limits to which states could fulfill their Pro-
tocol obligations through such sources.143  In another demon-
stration of the Contracting Parties’ willingness to compromise 
and save the Protocol, the EU made concessions and eliminated 
its quest for lower caps on credits for forest and agricultural 
land to which such sinks may be used to offset GHG emissions 
targets.144 
  
 137. Although these issues have largely been resolved through compromises 
made at COP 6 and 7.  Main points of Bonn deal, CNN, at 
http://www.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/europe/07/23/kyoto.points/ index.html (July 
24, 2001) [hereinafter Main points of Bonn].  
 138. Main points of Bonn, supra note 137. 
 139. Japan is a crucial party for the Protocol to be ratified.  Japan repre-
sents a large percentage of the world’s GHG emissions, and without U.S. 
sponsorship, any arithmetic that does not include Japan will almost certainly 
not add up to the 55% percent required for the Protocol to come into effect.  
See supra note 88. 
 140. Main points of Bonn, supra note 137. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 7, at art. 6.  
 143. The science of carbon sinks is not entirely clear and some evidence 
tends to show that mature forests may not soak up the same levels of GHGs 
as sinks created by reforestation, change in land use, or other improvements 
in land management.  Conflicting scientific evidence provides good fodder for 
disagreement.  See Can carbon sinks save our climate?, MSNBC, available at 
http://stacks.msnbc.com/news/ 654274.asp (Nov. 7, 2001). 
 144. Main points of Bonn, supra note 137; see also Kyoto climate wrangling 
continues, CNN, at http://www.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/europe/07/22/bonn. 
kyoto/index.html (July 22, 2001); see also Marrakesh Accords – Vol. III (Deci-
sion 12/CP.7), supra note 79, at 64. (this provision in the Accord is the result 
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Despite these other issues, it now appears likely that the ma-
jority of industrialized nations, excluding the U.S., will ratify 
the Protocol, as detailed by the Accords.145  The extent to which 
the Contracting Parties went in order to reach an agreement 
signifies their commitment to the Protocol and their willingness 
to work with the international community, even without U.S. 
support.  It is also important to note at this juncture that most 
opponents of the Protocol, with some notable exceptions, did not 
challenge the notion that some action should be taken to reduce 
GHG emissions.  This means that in theory the U.S. is not 
against reduction schemes and could possibly be swayed into 
action by the proven success of the Protocol or at least not at-
tempt to thwart its success. 
C. Will the U.S. Have a Change of Heart? 
British Environment Minister Michael Meacher exclaimed, 
“We have an agreement,” after emerging from the COP 7 in Mo-
rocco.146  It appears that, after a great deal of compromise, the 
Conference has come to an agreement that will be ratified by 
enough industrialized states, excluding the U.S., to come into 
force.147  “The big question is how we bring the United States 
into the biggest international effort against the greenhouse ef-
fect.”148  Despite the success of the parties at COP 7, this state-
ment reflects the feeling that the U.S. still has a role to play in 
the Protocol.  It also signifies that the Contracting Parties are 
still willing to negotiate with the U.S., should it reconsider its 
stance on the scheme.   
This interest to get the U.S. involved in international coop-
eration is not one sided.  The U.S. has also made numerous in-
dications that it has an international role to play in reducing 
GHG emissions.149  The U.S. is not actively seeking to obstruct 
the goals or implementation of the Protocol by any other 
  
of the EC compromise and allows Russia to claim up to  33 megatons of carbon 
per year, times five for forest management projects). 
 145. Climate Talks, supra note 15. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. (Olivier Deleuze, the head of the European delegation at COP 7, 
raised this question) 
 149. See supra Part III.A. 
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state.150  In fact, although the U.S. has stated that it will not 
ratify the Protocol, it nevertheless sent a delegation to Mar-
rakesh, which “weighed in heavily.”151  The U.S. Undersecretary 
of State Paula Dobriansky, who led the U.S. delegation in Bonn, 
stated that, “even in light of our position, this [attendance at 
COP 7] demonstrates our commitment to dealing with global 
climate change.”152  These explicit and implicit declarations 
show that both the U.S. and the international community have 
recognized the role the U.S. must play to be successful in reduc-
ing GHG emissions.   
In the coming years, international pressure on the U.S. may 
begin to intensify as opposition mounts to its continuing failure 
to curb its GHG emissions.  Despite its rhetorical adherence to 
the principles of the Protocol, the U.S. has not been successful 
in curbing its production of GHG emissions.  In fact, according 
to the U.S. Department of Energy, GHG emissions in the U.S. 
have actually increased 3.1% from 1999 to 2000.153  As a signa-
tory to the Protocol, the U.S. has an international obligation to 
not purposefully defeat the intention of the Protocol.154  Judging 
from these figures, the U.S. does not appear to be fulfilling its 
duties, and without question, the world is taking notice. 
Increasing pressure from abroad, U.S. willingness to engage 
in GHG emission reduction schemes, and international recogni-
tion of the U.S. role in reducing GHG emissions are all factors 
that may prove enough to eventually bring the U.S. itself into 
the Protocol or have the Contracting Parties establish some sort 
of a substantive relationship with the U.S. directly in combating 
GHG emissions.  However, any official relationship would be in 
addition to the de facto relationship that may arise as a result 
of widespread ratification of the Protocol.155  At minimum, these 
factors set the stage where the U.S. is in agreement in princi-
  
 150. CO2 Output Rose, supra note 18 (quoting Environmental Protection 
Agency Administrator Christie Whitman).  See also Work Starts on Kyoto Deal 
details, CNN, at http://www.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/europe/ 
07/23/kyoto.talks/index.html (July 23, 2001) [hereinafter Work Starts on 
Kyoto]. 
 151. Climate Talks, supra note 15. 
 152. Work Starts on Kyoto, supra note 150. 
 153. CO2 Output Rose, supra note 18. 
 154. Vienna Convention on Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 18, 1155 U.N.T.S. 
331, 8 I.L.M. 679. 
 155. This “de facto” relationship is the subject of infra Part IV . 
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ple, and probably will not take any affirmative action to hinder 
the success of the Protocol — even if it results in decreasing 
GHG emissions within the boarders of the U.S. 
IV. GETTING THE U.S. IN THROUGH THE BACK DOOR 
Thus far this Note has discussed the history and functionality 
of the Protocol and the U.S.’s criticism of it.  It has attempted to 
demonstrate that the U.S. is not per se against international 
efforts to reduce overall emissions of GHGs and will not actively 
seek to counter the positive effects of the Protocol.  Part IV ana-
lyzes the mechanics of how an international treaty, though not 
ratified by the U.S., may nonetheless have an effect on Ameri-
can citizens.  The answer lies in a combination of the phenome-
non of globalization, the expansion of U.S. industry abroad, and 
the specific nature of GHGs.   
A. Globalization 
Globalization, infused by technology, has brought people, 
places, and information together on a scale unprecedented in 
size or scope.  The era of globalization began in 1989 with the 
destruction of the Berlin Wall and the reunification of Ger-
many.156  The spy-counter-spy climate of the Cold War inhibited 
international cooperation and stifled economic interdependence.  
However, the relative safety that followed signaled an opportu-
nity for greater international cooperation and trust, fueled by 
peace and new technology.   
Thomas Friedman described this period as a series of four in-
terdependent revolutions or democratizations in four areas — 
the democratization of technology, finance, information, and 
decision-making.157  The democratization of technology was her-
alded by the advent of personal  computers, cellular phones, and 
especially the Internet.158  These advancements allowed people 
to communicate across international boundaries and extraordi-
nary distances, providing the informational backbone for fur-
  
 156. See THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE LEXUS AND THE OLIVE TREE: 
UNDERSTANDING GLOBALIZATION (2000). 
 157. The following discussion is based on the summary of Friedman’s argu-
ments in Daniel Gordon, Rosa Parks, The Lexus, The Olive Tree:  Omitting 
American Constitutionalism from a Theory of Globalization, 10 INT’L LEGAL 
PERSP. 345, 350 (1998). 
 158. Id. 
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ther developments in international interdependence.  The de-
mocratization of finance, resulting from the combined pressure 
of improved access to information and increased state regula-
tion favorable to personal/individual and international invest-
ing, remade the financial industry.159  No longer was ownership 
of bonds, common shares, IPOs, and derivative products limited 
to large corporations, nor were these holdings limited to domes-
tic markets.  In this manner, private individuals and corpora-
tions, through their investments, gained a larger place on the 
international stage.160  The democratization of information was 
both an integral part and a natural result of the progression of 
the other “revolutions.”161  The development of technology al-
lowed wide swaths of the world population access to information 
formerly unavailable to private individuals.162  State regulation 
was altered in such a way as to require investment entities to 
use these technological developments to publish detailed infor-
mation via the new methods.163  As a result, pertinent informa-
tion on all conceivable topics, including investment information, 
became available quickly and internationally.   
Finally, the democratization of decision-making refers to the 
decentralization of power and information.164  With the in-
creased complexities of their citizenry,165 governments have re-
sponded by decentralizing authority and delegating power to 
the likes of administrative agencies, committees, and other spe-
cialized bodies.  This furthered globalization by allowing for 
greater flexibility and fluidity in the decision-making process.166  
Friedman argued that these four revolutions “crumbled walls 
and controls between societies and economies throughout the 
world creating a wide-open economic and social plain that ex-
tended around the world.”167 
  
 159. Id. at 351. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. at 351. 
 163. Gordon, supra note 157, at 351. 
 164. Id. at 351–52. 
 165. The phrase “complexity of citizenry” means that through the democra-
tizations already discussed, private individuals and corporations have become 
both more informed and complex, and require additional functions from their 
governments.  See id. at 352. 
 166. Id. at 352. 
 167. Id. 
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These advances in technology, finance, information, and deci-
sion-making have created an international environment where 
economies have become intertwined and interdependent: 
The globalisation of economic activity [democratization of fi-
nance] has led to massive increases in both trade flows and 
cross-border investments.  Lower tariffs and the reduction of 
other barriers to trade [democratization of dec ision-making], 
combined with the pursuit of new customers and limited 
growth prospects in home markets, has pr ovided a powerful 
impetus for international expansion in many industries . . . 
[and an] urgent need for scale and scope efficiencies.168  
As the quote above implies, cross-boarder deals and overall 
increase in trade between states has placed new international 
actors in global competition across distances and boarders.  The 
simple fact that these entities are increasingly interacting in 
foreign jurisdictions necessarily entails that they are more and 
more being subject to the laws and regulations of these jurisdic-
tions.  This has created an entire body of international law 
called competition law, whereby jurisdictions are “competing” to 
create workable and attractive legal frameworks for transacting 
international business, but at the same time maintaining their 
state’s sovereignty and right to regulate those businesses oper-
ating within its territory.169  Suffice it to say, globalization170 
has increased the level of interdependency of states and signifi-
cantly increased the amount of contact entities transacting 
business have with foreign regulation. 
B. U.S. Corporations Abroad 
U.S. based corporations, reacting to the phenomenon of glob-
alization, have become increasingly multinational and more 
dependent on foreign markets not only as a source of sales, but 
  
 168. J. WILLIAM ROWLEY & A. NEIL CAMPBELL, INT’L BAR ASS’N, POLICY 
DIRECTIONS FOR GLOBAL MERGER REVIEW 9 (London 1999). 
 169. Katharina Pistor, The Standardization of Law and Its Effect on Devel-
oping Economies, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 97, 103–04 (2002). 
 170. This Note will hereinafter use the term “globalization” to refer to the 
increased interdependence of states, brought about largely as a result of the 
evidence put forth by Friedman.  See supra note 156. 
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for production,171 giving rise to large multinational corpora-
tions.172  These multinationals create affiliates in foreign juris-
dictions173 that allow (in this case) the American parent to bring 
together, in closer temporal proximity, the means of production 
and the markets that are being served.174  In this way, Ameri-
can companies’ significant capital expenditures have enabled 
them to extend their reach into numerous states and in the 
process, made themselves subject to the jurisdiction of these 
foreign states. 
The inroads made into foreign states by U.S. multinational 
corporations are particularly prevalent in the largest GHG pro-
ducing sector — manufacturing.  Manufacturing represents a 
substantial percentage of the total investment by U.S. entities 
in foreign jurisdictions.  In the year 2000, the total cash outflow 
from the U.S. for manufacturing was about $44 billion, which 
represents almost 31% of the total cash outflow for all indus-
tries.175  The priority that American capital is placing on manu-
facturing in foreign markets demonstrates that American enti-
ties are financing GHG production abroad. 
This slant towards the internationalization of American 
manufacturing can be seen in the numerous examples of large 
American companies operating in foreign jurisdictions.  For ex-
ample, Dow Chemical Inc. serves many local markets by repli-
cating its U.S. production facilities in other countries.176  Simi-
larly, Ford Motor Co. and General Motors Inc. have production 
  
 171. See Gordon H. Hanson et al., Expansion Strategies of U.S. Multina-
tional Firms, National Bureau of Economic Research (“NBER”) (Apr. 2001), 
available at http://www.bea.doc.gov/bea/papers/hms1.pdf. 
 172. A firm becomes multinational when it establishes in two or more coun-
tries business enterprises in which it exercises some minimum level of owner-
ship control.  Hanson, supra note 171.  For purposes of this section, this Note 
defines terms according to their use in the Hanson article. 
 173. A foreign affiliate is a foreign business enterprise in which there is U.S. 
direct investment.  The U.S. legal entity (e.g. business or individual) must 
have at least a 10% equity stake. A majority-owned affiliate is a foreign busi-
ness enterprise in which the U.S. entity has at least a 51% equity stake.  Id. 
at 2. 
 174. Id. 
 175. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Direct 
Investment Abroad: Detail for Historical-Cost Position and Related Capital 
and Income Flows 2000, Table 17, SCB (Sept. 2001), available at 
http://www.bea.doc.gov/bea/ARTICLES/2001/09september/0901USDIA2K.pdf. 
 176. Hanson, supra note 171, at 1. 
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facilities in Brazil and Thailand where they not only build vehi-
cles for local markets but for the broader regional markets of 
South America and Southeast Asia.177  Intel Corp. does not re-
produce its U.S. plant model but nonetheless produces its global 
semiconductor product abroad through a fragmented system 
with its wafer-fabrication plants in Ireland and Israel, and mi-
crochip-assembly plants in Costa Rica and the Philippines.178 
These multinationals are no longer the exception but the rule.  
The number of American affiliated companies in foreign juris-
dictions has remained high over the last decade.  In 1998, for 
example, American parent companies had 533 manufacturing 
affiliates in the United Kingdom alone, with an additional 323 
in Germany.179  Canada also had an overwhelming 533 Ameri-
can manufacturing affiliates within its borders.180  The crucial 
element is that all of these countries either have or will proba-
bly ratify the Protocol over the next year and will be responsible 
for lowering GHG emissions in their domestic jurisdictions, 
which apply to both domestic corporations and foreign affiliates 
alike.  Therefore, a large number of American affiliates181 may 
be dramatically affected by the Protocol’s implementation.  In 
this small sampling of three states, the Protocol will have an 
impact on almost 1,400 U.S. manufacturing affiliates physically 
located in Protocol-supporting states.  These companies and 
  
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Hanson, supra note 171, at 47. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Presumably this theory will also work in the reverse with foreign mul-
tinationals with affiliates and investments in the U.S.  American multina-
tionals are not the only entities that have significant investments in foreign 
jurisdictions.  In 1999, more than half of the $330 billion in foreign investment 
in U.S. manufacturing came from the environmental friendly continent of 
Europe.  These multinationals will already be under pressure from their do-
mestic governments as a result of the Protocol, and similar to the American 
companies, will try to reduce emissions wherever it is most cost effect, 
whether it be in the U.S. or otherwise.  See U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Bureau of 
Economic Analysis, Direct Investment Positions for 1999: Country and Indus-
try Detail, Table 4.1, SCB (July 2000), available at 
http://www.bea.doc.gov/bea/articles/internat/fdinvest/2000/0700dip.pdf (note 
that the figures are based on a historical-cost basis). 
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their U.S. parents will be forced to confront the global warming 
issue and deal with it on a mandated international scale.182 
C. GHGs Without Borders 
The preceding sections have established that through the 
forces of globalization, a number of large, multinational, U.S. 
firms with foreign affiliates have developed.  It is clear that 
these affiliates will be subject to jurisdictions that have or will 
ratify the Protocol, however, it remains to be seen how precisely 
this will affect the U.S. parent corporation domestically.  The 
answer lies in the nature of GHGs and GHG trading systems. 
One of the basic premises of the Protocol is that with regard 
to GHG emissions, there is no difference between reducing 
emissions in one part of the world or another.183  This means 
that a unit that is reduced in the U.S. is equally equivalent to a 
unit reduced in Europe.  Therefore, the market will naturally 
eliminate the most wasteful productions of GHG emissions, 
wherever they exist in the world.184  If an American affiliate is 
required to substantially reduce its GHG emissions in a foreign 
jurisdiction, it will either be forced to purchase additional units, 
fund projects to acquire ERUs, decrease its own production, or 
increase its own allotment by reducing emissions elsewhere in 
the parent corporation — including the parent’s state of domi-
cile, in this case the U.S. “Whether or not the United States 
signs Kyoto [the Protocol], multinationals know they’ll eventu-
ally have to deal with emissions caps in at least some of their 
territories.”185   
Therefore, these U.S. multinationals have already begun to 
position themselves to gain valuable experience in carbon trad-
ing and store up units while they are still relatively cheap.186  
  
 182. The mechanism for how affiliate liability for GHG emissions will affect 
the American parent corporation will be discussed more fully in the following 
section.  See infra Part IV.C. 
 183. This is the reason that the Protocol allows for trading in GHG units 
and provides for credits for carbon sequestration activities like aforestation 
and reforestation within the boarders of other states.  See Kyoto Protocol, 
supra note 7, at arts. 6, 12, and 17. 
 184. See discussion on market mechanisms supra Part II.B.  
 185. Foroohar, supra note 13 (quoting Economist Richard Sandor, who cur-
rently brokers GHG trades through his company, Environmental Financial 
Products). 
 186. Foroohar, supra note 13. 
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The global energy broker Natsource estimates that already 55 
million tons of GHGs have been traded since 1996 and that the 
market could expand to $200 billion within the next few 
years.187  These factors have led multinationals to take preemp-
tive measures such as investing in carbon sinks, and engaging 
in GHG trading, all of which could translate to domestic U.S. 
reductions188 of GHG emissions or American financing of reduc-
tions abroad.189 
For example, in May 2001, U.S. environmental nonprofit or-
ganization called the Nature Conservancy persuaded General 
Motors Inc. (“GM”) to give $10 million for rebuilding a Brazilian 
rain forest devastated by water buffalo ranching.190  GM’s 
money went toward replanting trees and preserving what re-
mains of the forest.191  Under the Protocol, the corporation could 
eventually receive credits for the carbon dioxide that the new 
forest will absorb over the next 40 years.192  GM might then be 
able to use those credits to offset some of its own emissions, al-
lowing it to meet targets for reducing GHG emission not just in 
the U.S., but also in any of its foreign affiliates directly im-
pacted by the Protocol.193   
Another attempt at preemptive action in the U.S. involves 
Native American tribal forestlands in Montana.  In the spring 
of 2001, a London company called Sustainable Forestry Man-
agement gave the Salish and Kootenai tribes of Montana, 
$50,000 to reforest 250 acres devastated by fire.194  In exchange, 
the company received the rights to an estimated 47,972 tons of 
carbon dioxide that the trees would absorb over the course of 80 
years.195  If their estimates are correct, a ton of GHG emissions 
may someday be worth $70 or more, meaning that the tribes’ 
deal could earn the corporation more than $3 million.196 
  
 187. Id. 
 188. The term “reduction” is being used to include carbon sequestration 
projects that remove carbon from the air and count towards Protocol goals. 
 189. Foroohar, supra note 13. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Foroohar, supra note 13. 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. 
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In addition to these external investments in carbon sinks, 
U.S. multinationals are already beginning to take part in trad-
ing schemes.  For example, there are plans to launch an Ameri-
can GHG trading platform called the Chicago Climate Ex-
change.197  Multinationals like British Petroleum (“BP”), Du 
Pont and Ford are participating in the design phase.198  BP has 
been particularly forward looking.199  It has already imple-
mented an internal system that sets company wide limits, and 
have divisions trade units between themselves.200  So far, the 
system has traded 5 million tons of emissions among its own 
divisions and helped the company meet its own emissions-
reduction targets while maintaining growth.201  One recent 
trade involved a petroleum division in the Gulf of Mexico, which 
needed more emissions credits to keep up with demand. It 
bought them from a slower-growing U.S. chemical division, 
which then used that money to purchase a new, more energy-
efficient furnace.202  In effect, the transaction reduced emissions 
on both sides of the deal and increased overall productivity.  
The main point is that the impact of the Protocol can already 
be felt in the U.S, and the Protocol has not even taken effect.  
Whether it is in the form of Montana carbon sequestration pro-
jects or international carbon trading, the world has become a 
smaller place and the U.S. can and will be impacted by wide-
spread adoption of the Protocol, even though they choose not to 
legally participate. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The refusal of the U.S. to ratify the Protocol does not prohibit 
it from having a significant impact on domestic GHG emissions.  
Globalization, market mechanisms of the Protocol, and in-
creased interdependence of the world’s markets prevent the 
  
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. 
 199. Although BP is not a U.S. multinational, its American colleagues are 
also well prepared for dealing with these issues.  This is especially true be-
cause many American multinationals already participate in a successful pol-
lution trading scheme for acid rain producing gases.  Therefore, these compa-
nies possess many of the competencies that will be required. See Yelin-Kefer, 
supra note 26, at 221. 
 200. Foroohar, supra note 13. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id. 
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unilateral acts of the U.S. from thwarting the intentions of the 
Protocol.  Nonetheless, the U.S. is demonstrably progressive in 
its efforts to curb its emissions, and appears to have already 
contemplated its role in international GHG reducing schemes 
such as the Protocol, as noted by Senator John McCain: 
Given the developing international market, it also makes 
sense to ensure that what we do domestically can be inte-
grated and recognized on the international level. Ultimately, 
we need to make sure that the emissions reductions our com-
panies, our farmers, and our foresters produce are fully recog-
nized and fully tradable in the emer ging global greenhouse 
gas marketplace. 203 
Hopefully, as indicated by the Senator’s quote, the  U.S. is 
preparing for the role it must play in reducing GHG emissions.  
However, by implementing the Protocol, the international 
community is demonstrating its resolve to act without U.S. par-
ticipation and its willingness to take the lead in creating the 
mechanisms within which global warming will be combated in 
the future.  
John F. Temple* 
 
  
 203. 147 CONG. REC. S8894 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 2001) (statement of Sen. 
McCain). 
 * The author would like to dedicate this Note to his parents John and 
Mary Temple and thank them for their support and encouragement. 
